the key questions

Mr Blair said his Iraq policy changed “dramatically” after 9/11. He feared hostile regimes could provide terror groups with WMD if they were allowed to develop them.

“From that moment Iran, Libya, North Korea, Iraq… all of this had to be brought to an end,” he said. “The primary consideration was to send an absolutely powerful, clear and unremitting message that after September 11, if you were a regime engaged in WMD you had to stop.” Saddam was targeted because he was already in breach of UN resolutions and had a history of using WMD.

2 Did you believe deposing Saddam Hussein was justified regardless of whether he was developing WMD?

Mr Blair blurred the distinction between disarmament and regime change. “These things were conjoined,” he said. “It was an appalling regime. You couldn’t run the risk of such a regime being allowed to develop WMD.”

3 What prior assurances or guarantees did you give President Bush that Britain would follow the US to war?

Mr Blair strongly denied he had given any secret assurances to President Bush.

“My position was not a covert position,” he said. “The only commitment I gave, and I gave this very openly, was to deal with Saddam. How we dealt with it was an open question.”

4 Were Parliament and the public misled about Saddam Hussein's weapons programmes by the statements you made and the dossier you produced?

Mr Blair admitted the intelligence over WMD had been proven “wrong” but said Downing Street had not intentionally misled anybody. He insisted all the intelligence had indicated Saddam was pursuing WMD. The infamous ‘45-minute’ claim, he said, had only become a major issue for people much later.

5Why did you wait so long before requesting legal advice over the war, and was the attorney general pressured into declaring military action to be legal?

Mr Blair said he had not requested formal advice in 2002 because military action was at that point “a long way off”, and denied any pressure had been put on the Attorney General, Lord Peter Goldsmith, to change his mind in early 2003 and back military action. The former Prime Minister also made it clear he would not have gone to war if the Attorney General had deemed it illegal.

6Were British forces properly prepared and funded, and were their preparations hampered by your decision to keep them secret?

Mr Blair said early preparations for war were kept under wraps to avoid giving the impression a decision on military action had already been taken. He insisted it was not until October 2002 that the army told him more public planning was required, to which he immediately agreed.

He also said more funding would have been made available if needed.

7 Was the aftermath of the war properly planned for, and do you accept responsibility for the failures that occurred?

Mr Blair said there had been an “immense” amount of British post-war planning, which was partially successful. “We didn’t end up with a humanitarian disaster,” he said. “In fact we averted it.”

But he accepted mistakes were made and said the post-war situation “was different to what we expected”.

“People did not think al-Qaeda and Iran would play the role they did,” he said.

8 When did you first realise Saddam Hussein probably did not have WMD, and what was your response?

Mr Blair said the realisation occurred slowly over the course of 2003 and 2004. “At the very beginning we were constantly getting reports about this site or that site, and we were trying to direct the armed forces there,” he said. “But over the course of 2004 it became very difficult to sustain this.”

9 What was Gordon Brown's role in the planning of the invasion, and how strongly did he back your stance?

The great unanswered question. The roles and viewpoints of Jack Straw, Geoff Hoon, Robin Cook, Claire Short and Lord Goldsmith were all discussed at length. But the then-Chancellor and second most powerful man in government was not mentioned in six hours of questioning.

10 What regrets do you have over the Iraq affair?

None. Mr Blair said there were lessons to be learnt in relation to the aftermath of the invasion, but was unrepentant about the fundamental decisions he made. He would have made the same decisions again.